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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine a remote town in need of water.  The townspeople 
determine a reservoir is necessary to supply the water required to 
maintain their normal way of life.  The town builds a dam, diverts a 
river, and as a result, creates a reservoir.  However, imagine now that the 
town designed the dam poorly.  Leaks sporadically burst open across the 
dam’s foundation, gushing water at an alarming rate.  Rather than fix the 
dam, the town diverts another river to the reservoir.  The leaks in the dam 
now produce a steady stream, and the reservoir’s water level continues to 
lower.  The town grows increasingly desperate and diverts yet another 
river to the reservoir.  The reservoir’s water level continues to lower 
though, and in an endless cycle of attempts to remedy the problem, the 
town stubbornly diverts more rivers to the reservoir.  The more logical 
solution to the problem would be to ascertain the design flaws in the dam 
and fix the leaks.  By avoiding the true problem—the faulty dam—the 
town wasted vital resources and endangered its future sustainability.  
Although the town’s reasoning may seem absurd, the illustration 
accurately depicts the Kansas pension crisis and the flawed rationale that 
Kansas pension law promotes. 
The hypothetical dam is the Kansas Public Employees Retirement 
System (KPERS), which oversees the largest pension fund in the state of 
Kansas.
1
  KPERS is responsible for the retirement plans of over 289,000 
state and local government employees and manages approximately $16 
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 1.  Gene Meyer, Kansas Boosts Pension Funding Now to Save Money Later, THE HEARTLAND 
INST., http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/kansas-boosts-pension-funding-now-save-money-
later (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).  




  The funds KPERS manages, similar to the hypothetical 
reservoir, are intended to provide employees with the means to sustain a 
normal lifestyle beyond retirement. 
KPERS affects more than retirees, though.  In fact, KPERS impacts 
almost every aspect of Kansas’s infrastructure.  The reach of KPERS is 
expansive, covering nearly 300 school districts, over 400 cities and 
townships, and more than 1,500 employers.
3
  Kansas’s teachers, police 
officers, firefighters, judges, and many others that currently serve as the 
backbone of the state and municipal systems rely on KPERS pension 
plans to safeguard their futures.
4
  In total, approximately 10% of all 
Kansas residents are members of a KPERS pension plan.
5
 
Beyond the clear importance of KPERS to the citizens of Kansas, 
there is an imminent problem lurking: KPERS is dangerously 
underfunded.  Kansas’s pension funding is below 60% of what will be 
due to future retirees,
6
 falling 20% short of the minimum amount needed 
to achieve a healthy pension fund.
7
  In total, KPERS has a $9.5 billion 
gap between state revenue and benefits owed to pension members.
8
 
KPERS has struggled with excessive liabilities for more than a 
decade,
9
 but Kansas pension law has been a consistent barrier preventing 
the legislature from properly addressing one of the key sources of the 
pension deficit: imperfectly designed KPERS plans.  The plans rely on 
high investment returns and underestimated lifespans of retirees.
10
  The 
                                                          
 2.  About Us, KPERS, http://www.kpers.org/about/home.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) 
[hereinafter About Us, KPERS].  
 3.  Alan D. Conroy, Exec. Dir., KPERS, Presentation materials from KPERS Legislative 
Update to the House Pensions and Benefits Committee, at 3 (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/committees/ctte_h_pen_ben_1/documents/testimony/2014
0113_01.pdf.  
 4.  See About Us, KPERS, supra note 2. 
 5.  Conroy, supra note 3, at 3. 
 6.  See id. at 7. 
 7.  See Public Pension Health by State, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Public_pension_health_by_state (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (“According to 
the Pew Center, in order for a state to have what is considered a fiscally sustainable pension plan, 
that plan must have a funded ratio of at least 80 percent.”).  
 8.  Frank Shafroth, Kansas’s March to Zero, TAX ANALYSTS (2015), reprinted in STATE TAX 
TODAY, 2015 STT 179-7 (2015).  
 9.  Benefit Changes Coming for KPERS Members, BENEFITWISE NEWSLETTER (Kan. Pub. 
Emps. Ret. Sys., Topeka, Kan.), Sept. 2013, at 1, 2, 
http://www.kpers.org/newsletters/pdf/benefitwise2013vol2_State.pdf [hereinafter BENEFITWISE 
NEWSLETTER]. 
 10.  See John Hanna, Report Says KPERS Needs Overhaul to Remain Solvent, LAWRENCE J.-
WORLD (Sept. 23, 2009, 7:59 PM), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2009/sep/23/report-says-kpers-
needs-overhaul-remain-solvent/ (showing that Kansas utilizes pension techniques that overvalue 
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plans also allow government officials to guarantee retirement benefits up 




The ability to correct the pension plans is severely hampered by the 
Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in 1980 to adopt California pension 
law (the California Rule).
12
  The California Rule prohibits modifications 
that reduce employee benefits unless the modifications are accompanied 
by comparable advantages.
13
  In application, the rule ensures that 
employees will continue to earn benefits at least as generous as once 
promised by the state.
14
  In other words, the rule permits unilateral 
decreases in employee contribution rates, increases in employee benefits, 
and a wide variety of other modifications that are viewed as beneficial to 
KPERS members.
15
  Conversely, there can be no increases in employee 
contribution rates, reductions in future benefits, or any other type of 
modification unfavorably affecting KPERS members unless the 
modifications are also accompanied by equivalent and offsetting 
advantages for KPERS members.
16
  As a result, the California Rule 
substantially limits the Kansas legislature’s ability to appropriately 
address pension liabilities. 
The Kansas legislature is growing increasingly active in its efforts to 
remedy the pension crisis.  Kansas plans to issue $1 billion worth of 
bonds to alleviate pension liabilities.
17
  Furthermore, modifications to 
                                                          
assets and project investment returns at an average of 8% per year); see Timothy W. Martin, Public 
Pension Funds Roll Back Return Targets, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/taxpayers-more-pension-burdens-headed-your-way-1441388090 
(illustrating the danger of relying on high investment projections, a decrease of only 1% on an 
investment return rate will typically increase pension liabilities by 12%); Scott Rothschild, KPERS 
Studies Increase in Retirement Age, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD (July 25, 2006),  
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2006/jul/25/kpers_studies_increase_retirement_age/?politics (stating 
a previous KPERS executive director’s opinion that the pension system is ill-equipped to handle 
longer lifespans of employees and that the minimum KPERS retirement age should be increased 
from 55 to 65); BENEFITWISE NEWSLETTER, supra note 9, at 2 (citing investment losses, longer 
member lifespans, and early employee retirements as partial causes of the pension shortfall).  
 11.  Hanna, supra note 10 (“[T]he current system allows state officials to promise good benefits 
now and let future officials worry about how to pay for them.”). 
 12.  See Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 475–76 (Kan. 1980) (adopting the rule 
outlined in Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765 (Cal. 1955)). 
 13.  See id. at 476. 
 14.  Alexander Volokh, Overprotecting Public Employee Pensions: The Contract Clause and 
the California Rule, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y 6 (July 2014), 
http://reason.org/files/overprotecting_pensions_california_rule.pdf. 
 15.  See id. at 6–7. 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Tim Carpenter, Governor Signs $1B Bonding Bill for KPERS, TOPEKA CAP. J. (Apr. 16, 
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pension plans are at the forefront of the legislature’s options to decrease 
pension liabilities.
18
  The impending pension crisis and pension 
modifications carry ramifications for employers, employees, and the 
entire state of Kansas.  Pension modifications also create legal questions 
regarding state employees’ rights to their dwindling pension funds and 
the Kansas legislature’s ability to restructure current pension plans 
without violating those rights. 
However, Kansas is not alone in addressing pension liabilities.  In 
2014, state pension plans in the United States were underfunded by $4.7 
trillion.
19
  Pension plans of twenty-six states have a funding ratio of less 
than 70% of pension liabilities.
20
  Accordingly, several state legislatures 
have attempted to reduce pension liabilities by modifying state pension 
plans.  The United States Supreme Court and the Colorado Supreme 
Court have recently addressed the legality of pension modifications, and 
in doing so, have provided an alternative path for the Kansas Supreme 
Court to potentially follow.
21
  The pension crisis and impending 
legislation provide the Kansas Supreme Court with a pivotal opportunity 
to learn from similarly situated courts and correct the legal precedent that 
has failed the Kansas retirement system. 
This Comment will navigate the ambiguous areas of Kansas pension 
law, clarify KPERS members’ potential claims, and provide a simple 
solution that creates a less restrictive precedent.  Part II will provide a 
general overview of KPERS, Kansas pension regulations, and the origin 
of Kansas’s precedent on the matter.  Part III will provide a detailed 
illustration of when KPERS members have potential claims, examine the 
policy purposes underlying the California Rule, illustrate the California 
Rule’s failure to fulfill its policy purposes, and explain how the United 
States Supreme Court’s recent pension analysis in M&G Polymers USA, 
LLC v. Tackett
22
 refutes the legal concepts that form the foundation of 
the California Rule.  Part IV will recommend that the Kansas Supreme 
                                                          
2015, 6:10 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/state/2015-04-16/governor-signs-1b-bonding-bill-kpers.  
 18.  See Conroy, supra note 3, at 16–20.  
 19.  Joe Luppino-Esposito, Promises Made, Promises Broken 2014: Unfunded Liabilities Hit 
$4.7 Trillion, STATE BUDGET SOLS. (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detail/promises-made-promises-broken-2014-
unfunded-liabilities-hit-47-trillion. 
 20.  Robert Hennelly, States are Staring at a Trillion-Dollar Pension Hole, CBS NEWS (July 
31, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/states-are-staring-at-a-1-trillion-pension-hole/. 
 21.  Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202 (Colo. 2014); M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. 
Ct. 926 (2015).  
 22.  M&G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015). 
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Court abandon the California Rule and discontinue its treatment of 
statutorily defined pension plans as contracts.  Part V will conclude with 
a summary of the proper outcome to the pension crisis. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section will first address the background of KPERS, the Kansas 
legislature’s previous attempts to remedy the pension crisis, and the 
characteristics of a KPERS retirement plan.  Second, this section will 
clarify how Kansas law differentiates between retroactive modifications 
to pension plans and prospective modifications to pension plans. 
A. Background of KPERS 
The Kansas legislature created the first KPERS plan in 1961 and 
offered it to state and local employees.
23
  Over the next several decades, 
the plan grew to encompass a variety of state employers and 
employees.
24
  KPERS currently administers three pension plans: a police 
and firefighters plan, a judges and justices plan, and the largest pension 
plan, known as “regular KPERS.”
25
  Regular KPERS includes state, 
school, and local employees.
26
  Its vast coverage constitutes 95% of 
KPERS active membership and is separated into three tiers.
27
  The 
factors that led to the creation of the current KPERS three-tier system 
illustrates the flawed logic that the California Rule promotes and the 
legislature’s inability to properly respond to the causes of the Kansas 
pension deficit. 
In order to fully understand the current KPERS system, the 
circumstances leading to pension deficit must be explored.  The 
economic downturn in 2008 harmed Kansas’s pension funding, but it 
does not explain the entirety of the problem.
28
  Benefit increases for 
members, low contributions, longer member lifespans, earlier member 
retirement rates, and economic downturns have all contributed to 
                                                          
 23.  Julian Efird & Michael Steiner, Review of KPERS History for the House Committee on 
Pension and Benefits, KAN. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP’T 1 (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/committees/misc/ctte_h_pen_ben_1_20130130_03_
other.pdf. 
 24.  Id. at 1–2.  
 25.  Id. at 1.  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Conroy, supra note 3, at 4.  
 28.  See BENEFITWISE NEWSLETTER, supra note 9, at 2. 





The legislature has struggled with excessive KPERS liabilities for 
more than a decade,
30
 but it has remained unable to deliver a sustainable 
solution to the problem.  In 2003, the legislature authorized the issuance 
of up to $500 million of pension obligation bonds.
31
  However, the bonds 
only served as a temporary solution.
32
  The legislature eventually closed 
the original retirement plan to new members, preventing all future 
government employees from joining.
33
 
The original plan is now labeled tier one, and the Kansas legislature 
created a KPERS second-tier plan in 2007 for new members unable to 
join the original plan.
34
  Accordingly, any state, school, or local 
employees becoming members after 2009 had to join the tier-two plan.
35
  
The tier-two plan was similar to tier one, but it contained modifications 
aimed at increasing payment responsibility for the employers and 
employees.
36
  For example, a tier-one employee contributed 4% of his or 
her salary to the pension plan, but a tier-two employee was forced to 
contribute 6%.
37
  However, the addition of tier two did little to resolve 
the problem of increasing pension liabilities, and in January 2015, 




New members are now part of tier-three plans.
39
  Tier-three plans are 
cash balance plans.
40
  A cash balance plan relies entirely on the dollar 
amount in the pension account, not on a formula.
41
  Under this model, the 
employer and employee make contributions to the retirement account, 
and the state adds a defined amount of interest credits.
42
  After 
retirement, KPERS annuitizes the employee’s pension account and funds 
                                                          
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Efird & Steiner, supra note 23, at 6.  
 32.  See id. at 6–7.  
 33.  Id. at 7. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See id. 
 37.  Id. at 4, 7. 
 38.  Id. at 7.  This legislation was passed by the 2012 legislature.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 7–8. 
 40.  Employer Manual, KPERS 2 (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.kpers.org/employers/manual/01aboutkpers.pdf.  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See id. 
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a lifetime of monthly payouts.
43
 
The cash-balance plan reduces the potential for excessive liabilities 
by limiting employee benefits to the balance in their accounts, rather than 
guaranteeing monthly payments for life.
44
  It therefore provides the 
government with a more conservative alternative to the defined benefit 
plans of tier one and tier two.
45
  Although this adjustment decreases 
liabilities correlated with new members, it does little to resolve the 
liabilities flowing from tier-one and tier-two plans. 
The defined benefit plans of tier one and tier two constitute the vast 
majority of the KPERS liability.
46
  Defined benefit plans guarantee 
particular benefits to members upon retirement.
47
  The benefits are 
calculated by utilizing a standard formula that factors in the employee’s 
duration of employment and salary.
48
  For example, the KPERS benefit 
ratio was 1.75% of a member’s final average salary.
49
  Imagine a retiring 
KPERS member with thirty years of state employment before January 
2014 and a $50,000 final average salary at the time of retirement.
50
  The 
member would be entitled to 1.75% of his or her average final salary for 
each of the thirty years of employment.
51
  In order to calculate the 
retirement benefit, the thirty years of employment is multiplied by the 
1.75% retirement ratio, amounting to 52.5%.
52
  Consequently, 52.5% of 
the $50,000 final average salary would constitute the retirement benefit.
53
  
The hypothetical employee would retire with an annual monetary benefit 




                                                          
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  FAQS About Cash Balance Pension Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_cashbalanceplans.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).  
 46.  See Conroy, supra note 3, at 5. 
 47.  John L. Utz, Kansas Legislature’s Legal Authority to Modify the Kansas Public Employees 
Retirement System (KPERS), KAN. POLICY INST. 1 (Sept. 2011),  
http://www.kansaspolicy.org/researchcenters/budgetandspending/budgetandspendingstudies/d78173.
aspx?type=view.  
 48.  Id. 
 49. Id. at 2 (noting the statutory multiplier for participating service before 2014 was 1.75%); see 
also BENEFITWISE NEWSLETTER, supra note 9, at 1–2 (noting the statutory multiplier for 
participating service January 2014 and after is 1.85%).   
 50.  See Utz, supra note 47, at 2. 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  See id. 
 53.  See id. 
 54.  Id. at 1. 
1120 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 64 
 
The benefits accorded to KPERS members through defined benefit 
plans are at the core of the pension debt.
55
  Initially, the legislature 
appeared determined to reduce liabilities by simply stopping additional 
employees from joining failing pension plans.  The creation of new tiers 
carrying less future liability was an attempt to simply cover previous 
obligations by lowering future obligations.  By refraining from making 
meaningful modifications to current employee pension plans, the 
legislature cautiously refused to trigger the California Rule, which 
prohibits decreasing future benefits for current pension members unless 
the modification is also accompanied by new and offsetting advantages 
for the pension members.
56
 
The strategy of restraining from meaningfully modifying pension 
plans proved to be the equivalent of disregarding a hole in a dam: the 
leak simply continues until the remaining water has drained.  Similarly, 
the KPERS fund continues to shrink because of the inherent flaws 
contained in tier one and tier two plans. 
Despite these problems, the Kansas legislature is growing 
increasingly aggressive with its remedies.  In early 2015, the legislature 
approved $1 billion worth of state-issued pension bonds.
57
  More 
importantly, it has also made several modifications to tier-one and tier-
two plans.
58
  The recent legislation pushes the limitations of the 
California Rule and begs the question: when do modifications to pension 
plans violate the rights of KPERS members? 
 B. Kansas Pension Law 
Kansas judicial precedents concerning the legality of pension plan 
modifications is vague, likely caused by the lack of state regulation on 
the matter.  The Kansas Constitution offers no guidance concerning state 
pension regulation, and Kansas statutory regulation is only applicable in 
limited circumstances. 
Consequently, the Kansas Supreme Court created its precedent from 
                                                          
 55.  See Reed Holwegner, Q-1 Kansas Public Employees Retirement System Retirement Plans 
and History, KAN. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP’T 2–5, http://www.kslegresearch.org/KLRD-
web/Publications/2015Briefs/2015/Q-1-
KansasPublicEmployeesRetirementSystemRetirementPlansandHistory.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 
2016). 
 56.  See Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 475 (Kan. 1980) (quoting Allen v. City of 
Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955)). 
 57.  See Carpenter, supra note 17. 
 58.  BENEFITWISE NEWSLETTER, supra note 9, at 1–2.  
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three key legal authorities.  The first is Kansas statutory regulation, 
which prevents retroactive modifications to pension plans.
59
  The second 
is the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, which the court 
employs to govern the contractual rights of employees to their pension 
benefits.
60
  Lastly, the Kansas Supreme Court adopted California judicial 
precedent for pension law, known as the California Rule.
61
  The 
California Rule is an interpretation of the Contract Clause, and it governs 
prospective modifications to pension plans.
62
 
1. The Kansas Statutory Prohibition of Retroactive Modifications to 
State Pension Plans 
Kansas statutory law protects employee pension plans from 
detrimental retroactive modifications.  Retroactive modifications are 
modifications to pension benefits that have already accrued based on 
previously performed work.
63
  Section 74-4923(a) is the only Kansas 
statute restricting potential modifications to pension plans.
64
  It provides: 
No alteration, amendment or repeal of this act shall affect the then 
existing rights of members and beneficiaries but shall be effective only 
as to rights which would otherwise accrue under this act as a result of 
services rendered by an employee after the alteration, amendment or 
repeal.  This subsection shall not apply to any alteration or amendment 
of this act which provides greater benefits to members or beneficiaries, 
but any increase of benefits shall only be applicable to benefits payable 
on the first day of the month coinciding with or following the effective 
date of the alteration or amendment.
65
 
The statute prohibits the legislature from modifying existing rights in 
a manner that is detrimental to KPERS members.
66
  Existing rights are 
best explained as the rights already earned by the services of a member.
67
  
In other words, the statute provides that the legislature cannot decrease 
benefits that were earned by an employee’s past services.
68
 
                                                          
 59.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4923(a) (Supp. 2014).  
 60.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 475–76. 
 61.  Id. at 475. 
 62.  Id. at 475–77. 
 63.  See Brazelton v. KPERS, 607 P.2d 510, 516 (Kan. 1980). 
 64.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4923(a). 
 65.  Id.  
 66.  Utz, supra note 47, at 2. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
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Brazelton v. KPERS provides an illustration of the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s application of the statute.
69
  In Brazelton, members of the police 
and fire departments contributed a percentage of their compensation to a 
state pension plan.
70
  The legislature subsequently raised the required 
contribution rate by almost 5%.
71
  The amendment to the contribution 
rate applied retroactively, requiring the members to pay extra for time 
already worked.
72
  The court struck down the amendment as a violation 
of section 74-4923(a) and clarified that the retirement benefits of an 
employee cannot be retroactively changed “in a substantial manner by 




The statute appears to substantially limit the legislature’s ability to 
modify pension obligations.  However, it is construed to only apply to 
retroactive modifications of existing rights.
74
  Not all modifications to 
current KPERS pension plans alter existing rights.  Because existing 
rights do not include future benefits, an employee’s future duration of 
employment does not constitute a period of time where an employee 
possesses the requisite existing rights.  Although employees enter into 
pension agreements under the consideration of the initial terms of a 
pension plan, section 74-4923(a) does not prohibit unilateral 
modifications to the benefits an employee will receive for work to be 
performed after the modification.
75
 
This conclusion is supported by Brazelton, where the court explained 
that if the amendment only modified current employee contributions for 
the future duration of employment, then such a modification may be 
acceptable under section 74-4923(a).
76
  Thus, the application of section 
74-4923(a) is strictly limited to detrimental retroactive modifications.
77
  
The legislature created no statute limiting its ability to make prospective 
modifications. 
                                                          
 69.  See Brazelton v. KPERS, 607 P.2d 510 (Kan. 1980). 
 70.  Id. at 512. 
 71.  See id.  
 72.  Id. at 516. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 514. 
 75.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4923(a) (Supp. 2014). 
 76.  Brazelton, 607 P.2d at 516. 
 77.  See id. 
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2.  The Contract Clause and the California Rule: Prospective 
Modifications to Pension Plans 
Although section 74-4923(a) only prohibits retroactive modifications 
to state pension plans, the Kansas Supreme Court has also created a 
judicial precedent restricting prospective modifications.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court has determined that statutorily defined pension benefits 
create enforceable contracts between the state and the members of the 
pension plan.
78
  Therefore, the court has determined the Contract Clause 




The Contract Clause stipulates that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . 
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”
80
  In 1980—when the 
Kansas Supreme Court first determined that the Contract Clause applies 
to state pensions—states varied widely on interpreting the Contract 
Clause’s effect on state pension rights.
81
  Typically, courts have held that 
the test for determining whether a state law violates the Contract Clause 
is whether the law (1) operates in substantial impairment of a contract, 
(2) serves a legitimate state or public purpose, and (3) adjusts the rights 
and responsibilities of the parties based upon reasonable conditions and 
is of a character appropriate to the public purpose for the law.
82
 
In Singer v. City of Topeka—the landmark case for Kansas pension 
law—the Kansas Supreme Court considered several methods of applying 
the Contract Clause in a manner applicable to state pension plans.
83
  
Most importantly, the court analyzed when prospective modifications 
should qualify as an impairment to the contract.
84
  For example, the 
Supreme Court of Arizona determined that any modification to a pension 
agreement without the consent of the employee constitutes an 
impairment to the contract and is therefore unlawful.
85
  Other states 
allowed their legislatures to unilaterally implement prospective 
                                                          
 78.  Galindo v. City of Coffeyville, 885 P.2d 1246, 1254 (Kan. 1994). 
 79.  Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 475 (Kan. 1980). 
 80.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 81.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 473. 
 82.  See, e.g., Denning v. KPERS, 180 P.3d 564, 569 (Kan. 2008); Bd. of Educ. of Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 443 v. Kan. State Bd. of Educ., 966 P.2d 68, 77 (Kan. 1998); Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs, 218 P.3d 400, 425 (Kan. 2009). 
 83.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 473–75. 
 84.  See id. at 475–77. 
 85.  See Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 545–47 (Ariz. 1965); see also Singer, 607 P.2d at 
474–75. 
1124 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 64 
 
modifications to pension benefits because they refused to recognize 
contractual pension rights for current employees.
86
  California held that a 
state may only make a prospective modification to a contract if it is a 
“reasonable modification.”
87
  In an effort to create a flexible rule, Kansas 
adopted the California Rule in its entirety.
88
 
By adopting the “reasonable modification” terminology from the 
California Supreme Court, the Kansas Supreme Court added a fourth 
step to determining whether a prospective modification violates the 
Contract Clause.  The fourth step can be broken into two parts to 
determine whether pension modifications are reasonable.
89
  First, the 
modification must bear a material relation to the pension fund’s 
successful operation.
90
  Second, any “changes in a pension plan which 




The first part of the California Rule mandates that the modification 
positively correlate with the success of the pension.
92
  The Kansas 
Supreme Court refrained from articulating clear guidelines to determine 
when a modification positively correlates to a pension fund’s success.
93
  
Rather, Kansas courts determine the issue on a case-by-case basis and 
analyze whether the pension modifications align with the goals of the 
Kansas pension system, such as protecting the financial integrity of the 
system or “other compelling reason[s].”
94
 
The second part of the rule—the balancing test—is the characteristic 
that differentiates the California Rule from the vast majority of other 
states.
95
  It mandates any disadvantage resulting from a modification 
must be accompanied by a comparable new advantage.
96
  In comparing 
                                                          
 86.  See Singer, 607 P.2d at 473–74. 
 87.  Id. at 475–76; see also Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955). 
 88.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 475–76; Allen, 287 P.2d at 767. 
 89.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 475. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. (quoting Allen, 287 P.2d at 767). 
 92.  See id. 475–76; Allen, 287 P.2d at 767. 
 93.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 475–76. 
 94.  Lea E. Selleck, Post-Retirement Employment Restrictions on Public Employees in Kansas, 
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 206 (1996) (quoting Brazelton v. KPERS, 607 P.2d 510, 517 (Kan. 
1980)).  
 95.  See Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and Its Impact on 
Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1032–33, 36 (2012) (“While the courts permit 
reasonable modifications of the contract prior to retirement, they do not allow any disadvantageous 
modifications unless the modifications are offset by comparable new advantages.”).  
 96.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 475; Allen, 287 P.2d at 767. 
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the potential advantages with disadvantages, the court does not consider 
the effect on individual employees, but rather, it considers the effects of 
the modification on the employees as a group or groups.
97
  The rule has 
no other provisions the court must consider.  By adopting the rule, the 
court avoided overly descriptive guidelines, and in doing so, gave itself 
great discretion to resolve fact-specific circumstances.
98
 
As a result, the California Rule affords extensive protection to state 
and municipal employees’ prospective pension benefits.  California 
courts have consistently enforced the balancing test to disallow changes 
in pension plans reducing monetary benefits without also adding a 
comparable benefit or simultaneously reducing employee contribution 
rates.
99
  Likewise, Kansas courts do not allow the legislature to increase 





This section will begin by addressing vested contractual rights under 
current Kansas precedent, providing clarification for when KPERS 
members possess plausible claims arising from prospective pension 
modifications.  Second, this section will demonstrate that the Kansas 
Supreme Court had reasonable and worthy policy purposes for adopting 
the California Rule, and therefore, the initial policy purposes provide an 
appropriate measuring stick to analyze the rule’s effectiveness.  Third, 
this section will illustrate that the California Rule has not only failed to 
fulfill its original policy purposes, but it also operates in a manner that 
directly conflicts with them.  Lastly, this section will clarify how the 
United States Supreme Court’s analysis of the Contract Clause in M&G 
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett
101
 explicitly rejects the legal analysis 
relied on by the California Rule’s interpretation of the Contract Clause.  
Ultimately, this Comment will advocate for the Kansas Supreme Court to 
abandon the California Rule. 
                                                          
 97.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 475. 
 98.  Selleck, supra note 94, at 207.  
 99.  Volokh, supra note 14, at 6–9.   
 100.  Selleck, supra note 94, at 207. 
 101.  M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015). 
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A. KPERS Members’ Rights to Their Pensions and the Distinction 
Between Vested and Non-Vested Rights 
Kansas courts have created a grey area of precedent governing the 
most fundamental element of Kansas pension law: vested contractual 
rights.  Because prospective modifications to pension plans must impair 
a KPERS member’s contractual rights to be considered a violation of the 
Contract Clause, a KPERS member must first obtain the contractual 
rights to be protected.
102
  An employee possesses absolute contractual 
rights once they are deemed a vested member of the retirement plan.
103
  
Once obtained, vested rights are substantial and are afforded the 
protection of the United States Contract Clause and the California Rule’s 
additional interpretation of it.
104
  Therefore, the difference between 
vested KPERS members and non-vested KPERS members is essential 
for determining a member’s prospective pension rights and the Kansas 
legislature’s ability to prospectively modify pensions.  However, it can 
be difficult to ascertain when KPERS members specifically obtain vested 
rights to the entirety of their pension benefits.
105
 
The Kansas Public Employees Retirement Act of 2009 sets the upper 
boundary for when a KPERS member must obtain vested rights.
106
  
Section 74-49,208 clarifies that KPERS members obtain “a vested 
retirement benefit in the system” after five years of credited 
employment.
107
  Although effective since 2009, Kansas courts have not 
utilized section 74-49,208 in a judicial opinion, rendering the statute 
open to interpretation.  The statute’s vesting period does not conflict with 
federal law limitations, and there is no reason to believe Kansas courts 
would find otherwise.
108
  Consequently, it is reasonable to assume 
KPERS members must obtain vested rights after five years of 
employment. 
However, KPERS members may obtain vested rights sooner than 
statutory law requires.
109
  The Kansas Supreme Court’s previous analysis 
                                                          
 102.  Galindo v. City of Coffeyville, 885 P.2d 1246, 1253 (Kan. 1994). 
 103.  See Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 473 (Kan. 1980). 
 104.  Id. at 475. 
 105.  See id. at 474–75. 
 106.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-49,201, 74-49,208 (2008). 
 107.  Id. § 74-49,208. 
 108.  See Volokh, supra note 14, at 10 (allowing states to determine there is no contractual right 
to pension benefits indicates the Supreme Court would not find a lack of protection for a state 
recognizing vested contractual rights). 
 109.  See Selleck, supra note 94, at 206. 
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concerning vested rights provides insight into when the court is likely to 
grant vested rights to KPERS members.  When the Kansas Supreme 
Court adopted the California Rule in 1980, it had the opportunity create a 
rigid and clear rule for determining when employees obtain vested rights 
in their pensions.
110
  There were a variety of persuasive cases on the 
matter, ranging greatly in their outcomes.
111
  The Supreme Court of 
Arizona provided a clear and strict rule that designated all contracts 
vested upon employment.
112
  Other states held that contracts did not vest 
until the employee’s retirement.
113
  The Kansas Supreme Court held that 
vested rights are earned after a “reasonable period of time.”
114
  
Consequently, Kansas judicial precedent fails to determine when 
employees specifically obtain vested rights in their KPERS pension 
plans. 
However, the court did establish guidelines for determining what 
constitutes a “reasonable period of time.”
115
  The outside parameters are 
gauged by time considerations.  A reasonable period of time must occur 
between an employee’s first day of employment and retirement.
116
  In 
Brazelton v. KPERS, the Kansas Supreme Court clarified, “when a 
person accepts employment with a governmental entity and becomes a 
participating member of the retirement system, he or she gains certain 
rights.”
117
  Therefore, although a new employee may not possess vested 
rights for every aspect of KPERS benefits, he or she may gradually 
accrue certain rights over the course of employment.
118
  Moreover, 




The employees’ actions are also utilized to determine when 
employees specifically obtain vested rights in the entire pension plan.
120
  
The Kansas Supreme Court provides “[c]ontinued employment over a 
reasonable period of time during which substantial services are furnished 
                                                          
 110.  See Singer, 607 P.2d at 474–75. 
 111.  See id.; Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 545 (Ariz. 1965); Tait v. Freeman, 57 N.W.2d 
520, 522 (S.D. 1953); Hickey v. Pension Bd. of Pittsburgh, 106 A.2d 233, 238 (Pa. 1954). 
 112.  Yeazell, 402 P.2d at 545. 
 113.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 474; see also Tait, 57 N.W.2d at 522. 
 114.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 474. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See id. 
 117.  Brazelton v. KPERS, 607 P.2d 510, 514 (Kan. 1980). 
 118.  See Selleck, supra note 94, at 206. 
 119.  Brazelton, 607 P.2d at 514. 
 120.  See Singer, 607 P.2d at 474. 
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to the employer, plan membership is maintained, and regular 
contributions into the fund are made . . . cause the employee to acquire a 
contract right in the pension plan.”
121
  The court merely describes actions 
that are typically associated with those of a contributing pension member 
and also mandates the employee provide “substantial services” to the 
employer.  The Kansas Supreme Court and the California Rule provide 
little guidance on establishing when an employee provides the requisite 
amount of “substantial services.”  Rather, Kansas courts determine when 
rights vest on a case-by-case basis.
122
 
In Singer, the court granted vested contractual rights to a firefighter 
after eleven years of credited service.
123
  At the time, the state firefighter 
pension plan designated vested rights as accruing after fifteen or twenty 
years of credited service, depending on which pension plan members 
opted to join.
124
  Thus, the Kansas Supreme Court illustrated it is willing 
to grant vested rights to KPERS members before it is statutorily 
obligated.  Although it remains unclear whether the court is willing to 
grant fully vested contractual rights before the statutorily mandated five 
years, KPERS members lacking five years of service still possess a 
plausible claim for vested contractual rights to future pension benefits. 
The determination of when vested rights occur is vital.  Vested rights 
not only inform employees when they have obtained contractual rights to 
the benefits they will rely upon in retirement, but they are also the line 
that the Kansas legislature must consider when contemplating the 
legality of prospective modifications to pension plans.  By refusing to 
firmly distinguish between two categories that have vastly different 
ramifications, Kansas courts have created a grey area of precedent 
governing the most basic element of pension law. 
B. The Purposes and Policy Considerations Underlying the 
Implementation of the California Rule 
The Kansas Supreme Court’s original policy purposes for adopting 
the California Rule provide an appropriate measuring stick for 
determining the rule’s success.  The court adopted the California Rule 
with two significant and interrelated goals in mind.
125
  First, the court 
                                                          
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Brazelton, 607 P.2d at 514. 
 123.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 474. 
 124.  Selleck, supra note 94, at 206. 
 125.  See Singer, 607 P.2d at 475. 
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adopted the rule to be flexible and capable of adapting to the changing 
needs of the state system.
126
  Second, the rule was meant to provide 
broad protection for state and municipal employees.
127
  The Kansas 
Supreme Court articulated noteworthy policy purposes underlying the 
adoption of the California Rule, and thus, the purposes are important 
considerations for judging the rule’s success and understanding why 
Kansas courts continue to employ it. 
The California Rule allows reasonable prospective modifications—
assuming the modifications contain benefits to counterbalance any 
detrimental aspects—to pension plans for a variety of public policy 
purposes.
128
  Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court has explicitly 
recognized that when changes are necessary for the greater good of the 
state, modifications may be made to state pension plans.
129
  In Brazelton, 
the court clarified that it may be necessary to modify pension plans “to 
preserve or protect the pension system; to maintain flexibility; to permit 
necessary adjustments due to changing conditions to protect the 
beneficial purpose of the system; to maintain the system on a sound 
actuarial basis or by reason of administrative necessity.”
130
  The court 
also stated that unilateral changes may be made when they are required 




The Kansas Supreme Court explicitly clarified that a primary 
concern for Kansas pension law is to protect the pension system and 
ensure its adequate funding.
132
  The court’s reasoning was sensible and 
clear, even identifying one of the contributing causes of the current 
Kansas pension deficit—changing conditions—that led to the economic 
recession that drastically increased Kansas pension liabilities.
133
  Not 
only did the court recognize the importance of remaining flexible to 
respond to changing conditions, but it also recognized that the financial 
integrity of the system is a valid reason to allow modifications to pension 
plans.
134
  The purpose of permitting such modification is “to protect the 
                                                          
 126.  Id.  
 127.  Brazelton, 607 P.2d at 518. 
 128.  Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955). 
 129.  Denning v. KPERS, 180 P.3d 564, 570 (Kan. 2008). 
 130.  Brazelton, 607 P.2d at 518. 
 131.  Id. at 517. 
 132.  Id. at 518. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
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beneficial purpose of the system.”
135
  The court’s position could not be 
more clear—by implementing pension law with the ability to protect the 
successful operation of the pension system, the court sought to create a 
rule capable of maintaining a pension system able to provide for state 
employees and retirees. 
In addition, the Kansas Supreme Court has also repeatedly, and 
unambiguously, identified the protection of state employees as a primary 
concern of Kansas pension law.
136
  The court cited the importance of 
pensions for inducing quality employees into initially accepting a 
governmental position, specifically stating that “[p]ublic employment 
seldom pays as much as a comparable job in the private sector.  A 
pension to be received upon retirement is a prime inducement in securing 
qualified workers and avoiding the expense of a high turnover rate.”
137
  
The court further clarified its protection of state employee pensions with 
a powerful explanation on the matter: 
It would take a compelling reason indeed, for this Court to hold that the 
[state or city] may, with the stroke of the pen, whether encouraged by 
the State Legislature or not, renege on its contractual commitments to 




The court correctly recognized that the very reason Kansas pension 
plans exist is to provide for the men and women serving the state.  
Consequently, the Kansas Supreme Court showed two essential purposes 
behind Kansas pension law: the importance of protecting the system and 
the importance of honoring the state’s commitment to employee 
pensions. 
The Kansas Supreme Court provides sound reasoning for the policy 
purposes underlying Kansas pension law.  Although allowing the 
possibility of pension modifications while simultaneously refusing to 
allow the state to renege on its commitment to employees seems 
contradictory, the court recognized that the relationship between pension 
funding and employee pension rights is not adversarial.  Rather, the 
health of the pension system is necessary to ensure employee pension 
rights remain unharmed.  Without the means to provide benefits to 
employees beyond retirement, Kansas would be forced to renege on its 
                                                          
 135.  Id.  
 136.  See id. at 514; Singer, 607 P.2d at 471. 
 137.  Brazelton, 607 P.2d at 515. 
 138.  Singer, 607 P.2d at 472. 
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commitment to provide retirement benefits and would consequently fail 
to achieve the law’s purpose of protecting state pension members. 
Although the Kansas Supreme Court provided sound rationale for 
achieving worthy motives, it made a critical error in declining to create 
its own pension law.  Rather, it adopted the California Rule to achieve 
Kansas’s policy purposes. 
C. The California Rule Conflicts with its Original Policy Purposes 
The California Rule fails to protect the Kansas pension system and, 
as a consequence, harms the state employees the rule seeks to protect.  
Examination of the California Rule’s key feature—preventing 
detrimental modifications to prospective pension plans without 
additional and comparable benefits—illustrates a domino effect of 
problems stemming from the rule. 
The California Rule confines the Kansas legislature’s ability to make 
any meaningful prospective modifications to state pension plans.
139
  The 
inability to decrease future employee benefits or contribution rates 
without equivalent advantages locks Kansas and its public employees 
into pension plans designed to yield efficient results in an economic 
market existing years, even decades, previously.
140
  It produces rigid 
pension plans that are incapable of adapting to an unpredictable free 




Without the ability to sufficiently reduce pension liabilities, the 
Kansas legislature has been forced to take increasingly desperate 
measures in an attempt to remedy the pension deficit.  When the 
legislature opted to create new tiers of KPERS for incoming employees, 
the new plans carried increased contribution rates and essentially passed 
previous liabilities onto new members uncorrelated with the previous 
pension problems.  Such a result is commonplace among states that 
protect prospective benefits because the inability to correctly allocate 
liabilities naturally leads to new employees bearing much of the financial 
burden while receiving disproportionately less benefits.
142
  Not only is 
                                                          
 139.  Utz, supra note 47, at 1–3. 
 140.  See Volokh, supra note 14, at 2 (“[T]he California rule, by freezing public-employee 
pension benefits in place, deprives governments of the flexibility to alter some of the future 
conditions of public employment.”). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Liz Farmer, How are Pensions Protected State-by-State?, GOVERNING (Jan. 28, 2014), 
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the result inequitable, but it also directly contradicts the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s reasoning for adopting the California Rule.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court cited the importance of protecting pension rights for 
enticing quality workers from the private sector,
143
 but by 
disproportionately placing additional obligations on the newest public 
employees, the rule hardly induces new hires. 
Moreover, closing pension plans does not eliminate a pension’s 
funding gap.
144
  Although the plan may be closed to new members, the 
state’s obligation to pay for the plan’s benefits still remains.
145
  The 
Kansas legislature’s closure of the tier one and tier two plans proved to 
be the equivalent of slapping a Band-Aid on a gunshot wound.  The 
legislature may have slowed the hemorrhaging of KPERS liabilities, but 
it did not resolve the ultimate problem.  Kansas’s $9 billion pension 
shortfall illustrates the inadequacy of simply closing failing pension 
plans. 
As a result, the Kansas legislature turned to a more drastic 
measure—passing a resolution to issue $1 billion worth of pension 
bonds.  Although the issuance of $500 million worth of bonds in the past 
provided a temporary solution for Kansas, it is exceptionally risky.
146
  A 
few previous pension bond deals exemplify the dangers of Kansas’s 
situation.  Similarly suffering from the California Rule’s ramifications, 
Stockton, California issued pension obligation bonds to resolve its 
pension deficit.
147
  The plan resulted in bankruptcy.
148
  Suffering from 
the California Rule’s ramifications, San Bernardino, California issued 
pension obligation bonds to resolve its pension deficit.
149
  The plan 
resulted in bankruptcy.
150
  Detroit, Michigan issued pension obligation 
                                                          
http://www.governing.com/finance101/gov-pension-protections-state-by-state.html.  
 143.  See Brazelton, 607 P.2d at 515. 
 144.  Pension Funding Gaps, AARP 3, 
http://assets.aarp.org/www.aarp.org_/articles/work/pension-funding-gap.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016).  
 145.  Id. 
 146.  See Rob Garver, Kansas Weighs Risky Bet to Cover Its Pension Needs, THE FISCAL TIMES 
(Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/02/10/Kansas-Weighs-Risky-Bet-Cover-Its-
Pension-Needs.  
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Karol K. Denniston, San Bernardino’s Financial Gordian Knot re: Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 
NAT’L L. REV. (May 27, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/san-bernardino-s-financial-
gordian-knot-re-chapter-9-bankruptcy.  
 150.  Id. 
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bonds to resolve its pension deficit.
151




The hazards associated with pension obligation bonds are not 
difficult to understand, but rather, they arise from the most basic 
elements of the pension bond strategy.  A pension bond plan revolves 
around three fundamental steps.  First, the government borrows 
money.
153
  Second, the government reinvests it.
154
  Third, the government 
hopes the investment receives a higher return than originally 
borrowed.
155
  Experts view the concept as speculative gambling, similar 
to the endeavors of an investor at Goldman Sachs,
156
 except that in 
Kansas’s scenario, the stakes are much higher.  An unfortunate 
investment could potentially result in the squandering of hard earned 
retirement benefits of 289,000 Kansas employees, or at the very least, a 
crippling burden placed upon Kansas taxpayers.
157
  Steve Anderson, the 
former Kansas budget director and current fiscal policy fellow at the 
Kansas Policy Institute, openly rejects the idea of pension bonds as a 




The Kansas infrastructure is also vulnerable because of the pension 
crisis.  School employees constitute 55% of state pension members.
159
  
Kansas lawmakers want the court to strongly consider deeming pension 
funding a portion of school aid.
160
  Kansas is required to spend $3,838 
per student on an annual basis for the public school system.
161
  Currently, 
any money devoted to pension funding does not qualify as a portion of 
the required amount for school aid.
162
  By labeling teachers’ pension 
funding a part of school funding, Kansas can effectively double-count a 
                                                          
 151.  Garver, supra note 146.  
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Eric Boehm, Pension Bonds Have Been Bad News, But Kansas is Betting on Them Anyway, 
KAN. WATCHDOG (Apr. 9, 2015), http://watchdog.org/211040/kansas-pension-bonds/.  
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  John Hanna, Kansas Lawmakers to Reopen Debate on Public Pensions, TOPEKA CAP. J. 
(Dec. 26, 2013, 4:50 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/state/2013-12-26/kansas-lawmakers-reopen-
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 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
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single payment and reduce the state’s liabilities.
163
  Although this may be 
an efficient accounting standard, it carries alarming real-world 
repercussions.  The Kansas Association of School Boards believes that 
virtually all money available for school districts will be redirected to 
pension funds.
164
  In essence, the strategy diverts vital resources from 
Kansas classrooms to KPERS pension plans. 
When considering the totality of the California Rule’s results, it 
becomes evident the rule fails to uphold the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
initial policy considerations for implementing it.  The rule effectively 
prohibits the Kansas legislature from making meaningful modifications 
to a flawed pension system and leaves KPERS members in a state of 
uncertainty; and consequently, it endangers the KPERS system and the 
members it is meant to protect. 
D.  The California Rule Conflicts with the United States Supreme 
Court’s Application of the Contract Clause 
The Kansas Supreme Court possesses the authority to reform Kansas 
pension law without conflicting with federal law.  Although the 
California Rule is an interpretation of the United States Contract Clause, 
the Kansas Supreme Court is not required to follow the California 
Rule.
165
  In actuality, the California Rule affords much greater protection 
to pension plans than the United States Supreme Court has indicated is 
necessary. 
The California Rule produces two basic contractual results, both of 
which inherently contradict fundamental contract principles.  First, the 
California Rule leads to the interpretation of statutes as contracts with 
very little concern as to whether the legislature actually intended to enter 
into a contractual agreement.
166
  Second, the California Rule then 
interprets the United States Contract Clause to provide vested contractual 
rights for life.
167
  The United States Supreme Court has long disagreed 
with the California Rule’s first result, explicitly warning against the 
supposition that the legislature may enter into statutorily defined 
contracts without the legislature’s explicit consent.
168
  Although the 
                                                          
 163.  See id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  See Volokh, supra note 14, at 11. 
 166.  Monahan, supra note 95, at 1060, 1071. 
 167.  See Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 475–76 (Kan. 1980). 
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Court has maintained this legal principle for decades, the California Rule 
has endured. 
As for the California Rule’s second effect, a majority of states refuse 
to afford protection to prospective modifications that are as extensive as 
the California Rule provides, offering an indication that the California 
Rule delivers more protection than the Contract Clause requires.  
However, the California Rule not only provides more protection than the 
Contract Clause requires, it also provides more protection than the 
Contract Clause is intended to provide. 
The 2015 United States Supreme Court decision M&G Polymers 
USA, LLC v. Tackett
169
 unambiguously clarifies that the California Rule 
is defective pension law.
170
  In M&G Polymers, the Court overturned 
International Union, United Automobile, AeroSpace, & Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America v. Yard-Man, Inc.,
171
 a longstanding and 
controversial Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which held that 
ambiguous provisions governing collective bargaining retirement 
benefits should be construed to vest for life.
172
  In Yard-Man, the Sixth 
Circuit determined that although the collective bargaining agreement 
contained a specified duration, the provision identifying the retirement 
benefits lacked such a duration, and therefore, constituted vested benefits 
for the remainder of the employees’ lives.
173
  The court purportedly used 
the basic principles of contract interpretation to reach its conclusion, and 
it justified its decision by explaining that retirement benefits are 
“typically understood as a form of delayed compensation.”
174
  
Consequently, the court determined the parties possessed an implicit 
intent for the retirement benefits to vest for life.
175
 
In M&G Polymers, the United States Supreme Court rejected 
virtually every aspect of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Yard-Man.
176
  The 
Supreme Court found that Yard-Man disregards the importance of 
determining the intention of the parties and “violates ordinary contract 
principles by placing a thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree 
                                                          
(1985). 
 169.  M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015). 
 170.  See id. at 930 (overturning a case based on facts very similar to the California Rule). 
 171.  Int’l Union, United Auto., AeroSpace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Yard-Man, 
Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983).  
 172.  M&G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 932; Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.  
 173.  M&G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 932. 
 174.  Id. (quoting Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 937. 
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benefits in all collective-bargaining agreements.”
177
  Yard-Man not only 
misapplied the contractual principles it utilized, but it also completely 
disregarded other fundamental contractual principles.
178
  In the words of 
the Supreme Court, “the Court of Appeals failed to consider the 
traditional principle that ‘contractual obligations will cease, in the 
ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining agreement.’”
179
 
The Supreme Court’s explicit rejection of Yard-Man is significant 
for Kansas pension law because of the astounding similarities shared by 
the Yard-Man rule and the California Rule.  Although Yard-Man 
addressed a private sector issue detached from the Contract Clause, the 
ultimate analysis for determining the intention of employers to create 
vested pension benefits relies upon the same contractual principles in 
both public and private sectors.
180
  Similar to the California Rule, the 
court in Yard-Man employed contract principles to interpret retirement 
benefits vest for life, drastically limiting any ability to legally alter the 
prospective aspects of pension plans.
181
  Also similar to the California 
Rule, the Yard-Man interpretation was in the minority; no other circuit 
court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that pensions create irrevocable 
lifetime promises.
182
  The ramifications of the rules are also alike.  
Employers located within the Sixth Circuit found themselves trapped in 
strict, non-negotiable agreements that vastly increased liabilities.
183
  
Unfortunately, before the Supreme Court rejected its flawed analysis, the 
Yard-Man rule led to numerous bankruptcies.
184
 
However, KPERS is not necessarily predestined to a similar fate.  As 
the United States Supreme Court illustrated in M&G Polymers, Kansas is 
not only legally able to abandon the California Rule, but its abandonment 
                                                          
 177.  Id. at 935. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 937 (quoting Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 207 (1991)). 
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 184.  Id.  
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would also align the state with fundamental legal principles.  
Considering the Kansas Supreme Court applies the California Rule as an 
attempt to construe the federal Contract Clause, it would be irrational to 
continue its application after the United States Supreme Court has 
explicitly rejected such an interpretation. 
IV. RECOMMENDATION 
The Kansas Supreme Court should abandon the California Rule.  The 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. 
Tackett openly displayed the fundamental flaws underlying the 
California Rule’s reasoning.
185
  Interpreting a non-durational statute or 
contract provision to produce nearly irreversible lifetime benefits 
conflicts with basic contractual principals.
186
  Thus, the Kansas Supreme 
Court should refuse to interpret statutorily defined pension benefits as 
unalterable contractual agreements. 
Pension laws vary drastically by state, providing the Kansas 
Supreme Court with several viable alternatives to the California Rule.  
Certain states brand pension benefits as mere gratuities, free to be 
unilaterally altered in a retroactive or prospective manner.
187
  Other states 
classify pension benefits as property rights, triggering due process 
concerns.
188
  On the most restrictive end of the spectrum, certain states 
are compelled by their state constitutions to grant employees contractual 
rights to retroactive and prospective pension benefits.
189
  The Kansas 
Constitution contains no such restriction, which provides the Kansas 
Supreme Court with a second chance to select the legal theory properly 
suited to address the needs of the pension system. 
Moreover, a diversion from the California Rule would not be 
uncharted territory.
190
  Of the twelve states that originally adopted the 
California Rule, three states have diverged from its standard in 
meaningful ways.
191
  In certain circumstances, Massachusetts has 
deviated from the balancing test contained in the California Rule, 
allowing detrimental alterations to pension benefits without comparable 
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  The Oregon Supreme Court upheld a statutory 
amendment that prospectively removed a tax exemption on public 
employee pension benefits.
193
  Most significantly, the Colorado Supreme 
Court appeared to completely diverge from the California Rule by 




The Kansas Supreme Court should follow the lead of its neighboring 
state and end the flawed recognition of statutorily defined pension 
benefits as contracts.  In 2014, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed 
pension modifications in Justus v. State.
195
  Similar to Kansas, Colorado 
faced a crippling pension deficit.
196
  As a result, the Colorado legislature 
capped cost of living adjustments.
197
  The Colorado Supreme Court 
determined that the relevant statute did not form a contract, and 
therefore, employees possessed no contractual rights to the prospective 
cost of living adjustments.
198
  The court recognized the longstanding rule 
that statutory enactments do not create contracts unless there is a clear 
indication of the legislature’s intent to be bound.
199
  Although the 
concurring opinion encouraged the majority to officially end its 
precedent that labels Colorado’s statutorily defined pension plans as 




The Kansas Supreme Court should advance the rationale utilized in 
Justus and explicitly reject the Kansas precedent labeling statutorily 
defined pension benefits as contracts.  As the United States Supreme 
Court has stated, “the principal function of a legislature is not to make 
contracts, but to make laws that establish the policy of the state.  Policies, 
unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and repeal.”
201
  The 
Court has been clear on this matter, explicitly warning against 
interpreting a statute as a contract without the legislature’s consent 
because it “limit[s] drastically the essential powers of a legislative 
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  The Kansas Supreme Court should recognize the United States 
Supreme Court’s reasoning and free Kansas from the shackles of the 
California Rule. 
Although abandoning a rule providing extensive protection for 
pension members may appear to be a worrisome proposition—perhaps 
why the California Rule has endured for so long—this hesitancy is 
predicated on a false sense of protection for pension members.  The 
American dream revolves around opportunity and finding a better life.  
Underlying the American dream is the prospect of an enjoyable 
retirement.  It is a natural inclination to protect the benefits that enable a 
storybook ending to the American dream.  This inclination is illustrated 
by the Kansas Supreme Court’s analysis in Singer v. City of Topeka, 
where it adopted the California Rule based almost entirely on policy 
considerations.
203
  However, neither legal principles nor policy 
considerations support the grant of unalterable lifetime pension benefits. 
In truth, abandoning the California Rule would not only remove a 
precedent borne through faulty contractual reasoning, but it would also 
relieve Kansas of the restrictions that contributed to the current pension 
deficit.  The rule endangers the pension system,
204







 and Kansas taxpayers.
208
  Perhaps 
most frightening, it manages to do all of this under the guise of 
protecting the integrity of the system.  In order to truly protect the 
integrity of the system—one of the key policy purposes for adopting the 
California Rule—the Kansas Supreme Court must allow prospective 
modifications to pension plans.  The alternative is to jeopardize KPERS 
members’ futures, letting them rely on a pension fund that may go 
bankrupt before contributing members see a single benefit. 
The abandonment of the California Rule would give the Kansas 
legislature the freedom necessary to properly address the pension deficit.  
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The legislature would be able to modify pension plans without 
simultaneously being forced to add a comparable benefit.  Therefore, 
modifications to reduce liabilities would not have to be accompanied by 
modifications that simply increase liabilities for a different aspect of the 
pension plan.  For most states, a contribution increase of only 2.2%—
without the addition of comparable benefits—is capable of providing for 
retirees and resolving the average pension deficit within thirty years.
209
 
Most importantly, KPERS members would still possess rights to all 
retroactive pension benefits.  Section 74-4923(a) would continue to 
collectively prohibit detrimental retroactive modifications to employee 
benefits, which would firmly protect KPERS members’ accrued pension 
benefits.  This outcome is similar to a vast majority of pension plans 
across America, which operate under the Employee Retirement Income 
Act (ERISA).
210
  Similar to ERISA, which governs private pensions 
nationwide, the legislature would be strictly prohibited from altering any 
benefits a pension member has already earned but may make alterations 
affecting the rate at which future benefits are earned.
211
  As a result, the 
new precedent would realign Kansas pension law with generally 
accepted legal principles, provide the flexibility needed to remedy the 
pension deficit, and also provide reasonable and customary pension 
protection for KPERS members. 
V. CONCLUSION 
KPERS members and the citizens of Kansas deserve better than the 
California Rule.  Abandoning the California Rule and only interpreting 
statutes as contracts when the legislature explicitly intends to be bound is 
a simplistic and honest resolution to the growing pension crisis.  Rather 
than continue to promise benefits that Kansas is fiscally unable to deliver 
upon, the court must untie the legislature and permit pension 
modifications before the deficit affects the retirement plans of 289,000 
Kansas employees. 
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